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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
VINCENT L. BELGARD, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 15743 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Vincent L. Belgard appeals from 
a conviction of automobile homicide in the Third Judicial 
Court, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Vincent L. Belgard, was charged 
with automobile homicide, a felony in the third degree, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (1953) as amended. 
Appellant was also charged with failure to stop 
at the scene of an injury accident, a class A misdemeanor, 
in violation of § 41-6-31 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
'·. 
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On November 17, 1977 the appellant was convicted 
by a jury on both counts; and received sentences of o - 5 
years for automobile homicide, and one year for failure 
to stop at the scene of an injury accident. Both sentences 
are to run concurrently. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the convictions 
and judgments rendered in the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At approximately 1:20 p.m. on July 28, 1977 
several people witnessed the appellant, who was driving 
his automobile south on 700 east, run a red light at the 
intersection of 700 east and 3300 south and strike Michael 
Winn (who later died from injuries suffered) as he began 
to cross the intersection on foot. After striking the 
victim, the appellant continued southbound without stopping 
(T. 89 Vol. II) ( T. 5 Vol. III) (T. 25 Vol. III). Three 
witnesses pursued the appellant in their vehicles to a 
point where he turned off 700 east and came to a stop at 
a residence about 635 east 3835 south (T.107 Vol. II). 
One of the witnesses made a citizen's arrest (T.125 Vol DI 
(T.11 Vol. III) (T. 31 Vol. III) and another called the 
'-. 
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police (T.12 Vol. III). The witnesses remained with the 
appellant until the police arrived, except for a "few seconds" 
(T.99 Vol.II, T.13 Vol.III) when he stepped inside the 
house to get a wash cloth to wipe blood from his nose and 
mouth. The witnesses testified that appellant's breath 
smelled of alcohol (T.101 Vol.II, T.13, 32 Vol. III) and 
also that.his difficulty in walking and his slurred speech 
gave them the impression he was drunk. (T.98 Vol. II) 
About fifteen minutes later, Trooper Lynn Thompson arrived 
at the scene. He also testified that appellant appeared 
drunk due to his speech, diffulty in walking and the odor 
of alcohol on his breath (T.49, 50 Vol.III). However, 
because appellant had suffered some injuries he was not 
given a field sobriety test (T.32 Vol.l). For appellant's 
own safety, and to provide him with medical assistance, 
Trooper Thompson took him into custody and drove him to 
St. Marks Hospital (T.59 Vol.III). The officer advised 
appellant of the terms of Utah's implied consent law and 
§ 76-5-207 of the Utah Code, and requested that he submit 
to a blood test (T. 49, 50 Vol. 1). Initially appellant 
objected to the test as a violation of "God's Law",(T.50 
Vol. 1), but by the time arrangements for taking the blood 
'-. 
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sample had been completed, the appellant voluntarily 
walked into the room, laid down on the gurney and ex-
tended his arm to have a blood sample drawn. (T.48 Vol.l), 
the sample was drawn by Ms. Kay Fowler, a registered nurse 
employed by the City-County Health Department to draw 
blood for the police department (T.69 Vol.III). The blood 
sample was analyzed by Mr. Lynn Davis, a chemist for the 
City-County Health Department, (T.79 Vol.III), who deter-
mined the blood alcohol content to be .28%. (T.90 Vol.III). 
Trooper Clark Bowles later testified that given the facts 
in evidence, the blood alcohol level of appellant could 
not have been less than .08% at the time of the accident. 
(T.14 Vol.III). 
On August 1, 1977, before any complaints were 
filed (M.8) appellant was arraigned and plead guilty in 
the justice court before Judge Charles Jones on five counts 
1) driving under the influence, 2) improper registration, 
3) fraudulent registration 4) no driver's license, and 
5) no inspection (M.6-8). On August 3, 1977, Judge Jones 
vacated the plea of guilty, and appellant subsequently was 
tried in district court on the counts of automobile homicid< 
and failure to stop at the scene of an injury accident 
(R.25) appellant was convicted on both counts (R. 97,98). 
-4- '·. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A. 
APPELLANT'S BLOOD 
SAMPLE WAS NOT OBTAINED 
IN VIOLATION OF HIS RELI-
GIOUS SCRUPLES, AND CON-
SEQUENTLY THE ADMISSION OF 
THE PESULTS OF THE BLOOD 
_11.LCOHOL ANALYSIS WAS NOT 
A VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S 
FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS. 
Appellant argues that the admission by the 
trial court of the results of the blood test was a 
violation of his Fourth Amendment Rights because the 
blood sample was drawn after he purportedly objected to 
the extraction of his blood on religious grounds. 
The facts reflect that after Officer Lynn 
Thompson told aopellant that a blood test was going to 
be taken, aopellant merely stated "it is against God's 
law" and "I don't want it". No elaboration was made bv 
appellant as to what he meant. (T. 47, 50, 53; Vol. I) 
Later, when final preparations were made for the te~t nt the 
hospital, appellant freely and of his own accord walked 
into the room where the blood was to be drawn, laid down 
on the gurney, and extended his arm so that the blood could 
be taken. Ms. Kav Fowler, a registered nurse, nroceeded to 
draw the blood in normal fashion without encountering any 
resistance from ap~ellant. (T. 48 Vol. 1). 
'·. 
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No evidence was offered at trial to show that appellant 
belonged to any type of a religious organization or ad-
hered to a personal religious dogma, a basic tenet of 
which forbade submitting to a blood sample. 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), 
established the general rule that blood samples can be 
taken from arrested individuals without their consent 
so long as the Police officer has probable cause to 
believe that the defendant has been driving while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor, and the blood 
sample is taken in a proper medical environment by quali-
fied medical personnel. Under such circumstances, there 
• 
is no violation of the Fourth Amendment. Appellant contena 
however, that the United States Supreme Court in Schmerber, 
~, also carved out an exception to the above general 
rule at 384 U.S. 771 of its decision wherein the Court 
stated: 
Petitioner is not one of the 
few who on grounds of fear, concern 
for health, or religious scruple 
might oref er some other means of 
testing, such as the "breathalyzer" 
test petitioner refused, seen. 9, 
supra: We need not decide whether 
such wishes would have to be respected. 
Appellant therefore claims he falls within this alleged 
exception. 
'·. 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
At the outset, it is clear that the Court did 
not expressly establish a religious scruple exception to 
it's own decision in Schmerber. Rather, the Court 
explicitly refused to decide whether any such exception 
would be recognized. Thus, appellant's statement at p. 9 
of his brief is inaccurate where he states: 
. . • since the blood samole 
in this case was obtained aaainst his 
wishes and in violation of his reli-
gious scruples, this case falls with-
in the exception imolicity [sic] recog-
nized by the United States Suoreme 
Court in Schmerber. · 
Similarly, appellant's characterization of the above 
passage in Schmerber at p. 10 of his brief is also inaccu-
rate and misleading where he says: 
"Under the reasoning of Schmerber, 
supra, where a person refuses to consent 
~blood test on religious grounds, 
a result oooosite to that reached in 
Schmerber 1; appropriate." 
In short, the United States Supreme Court refused to decide 
whether an objection to a blood test on religious grounds 
would make any difference. Indeed, appellant has failed 
to cite any case authority which has held that an extraction 
of blood over an arrested person's protests on religious 
grounds would violate the Fourth A.Tttendment prohibition 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
'·. 
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---
Although respondent was unable to locate 
caselaw directly on point within the context of the 
instant case, there is substantial caselaw determining 
when claims based on religious beliefs should be upheld,and 
when First Amendment protection has been denied to alleged 
religions or religious tenets that are shams designed 
to exploit the constitution, and which are devoid of reli-
gious sincerity. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 
215 - 216 (1972), the United States Supreme Court had to 
determine the legality of refusals by the Old Order Amish 
to send their children to school after the eighth grade. 
The Court stated: 
Although a determination of 
what is a 'religious' belief or prac-
tice entitled to constitutional pro-
tection may present a most delicate 
question, the very concept of ordered 
liberty precludes allowing every 
person to make his own standards on 
matters of conduct in which society 
as a whole has important interests. 
The courts have therefore developed certain criteria in 
determining the validity of religious claims including 
the history and age of the sect, Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); whether the asserted 
religion has the characteristics associated with traditioo~ 
-8-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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"recognized" religion, Remers v. Brewer, 361 F. Supp. 537 
(N.D. Iowa 1973), aff'd 494 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1974), 
Cert. denied 419 U.S. 1012 (1974), Fulwood v. Clemmer, 406 
F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962); and the sincerity of the 
belief of the religious sect, or the individual. 
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), Welsh v. 
United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), Hemes v. McNulty, 432 
F. 2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1970), Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390 
(5th cir. 1974). 
In United States v. Seeger, the United States 
Supreme Court considered whether several conscientious 
objectors had established the validity of their religious 
objections to induction into the Armed Forces. The court, 
holding that the petitioners qualified for conscientious 
objector status, stated that in order for a person to 
establish the validity of an all~ged religious belief,if 
he is not a member of certain recognized exempt religious 
organizations, he must demonstrate "a sincere and meaningful 
belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a 
place parallel to that filled by the God of those admit-
tedly qualifying for the exemption. . " Seeger, at 176. 
"While the 'truth' of a belief is not open to question, 
there remains the significant question ~hether it is 
'-, 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'truly held'. This is the threshold question of sincerity 
which must be resolved in every case. It is, of course, 
a questio·n of fact. . Seeger, at 18 5. The court also 
stated it is the duty of the court "to decide whether the 
beliefs professed by [Petitioners] are sincerely 
held and whether they are, in [their own scheme of 
things, religious." Seeger, at 185. 
Two years later, the District of Columbia Distric: 
Court in United States v. Kuch, 288 F Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1%: 
held that a woman who professed to be a member of a church 
which used Marijuana and LSD as its sacraments failed to 
demonstrate the sincerity of her religious beliefs. Con-
sequently her motion to dismiss charges of unlawful obtaini: 
and transferring marijuana, and unlawful sale, delivery and 
possession of LSD, was denied. Regarding her claim that 
handling the contraband was pursuant to a religious belief, 
the court stated: 
What is lacking in the proofs 
received as to the Neo-American Church 
is any solid evidence of a belief in 
a supreme being, a religious discipline, 
a ritual, or tenets to guide one's 
daily existence. 
In short, she has totally failed 
in her burden to establish her alleged 
religious beliefs, an essential premise 
to any serious consideration of her motion 
to dismiss. 
Kuch, at 438, 439. 
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In Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), 
another conscientious objector case, the Supreme court 
made it clear that a belief must not only be sincere, but 
must be a constant and ongoing dogma. The Court stated 
that a conscientious objector must hold "deeply and sin-
cerely ... beliefs that ... impose upon him a duty of 
conscience to ref rain f rorn participating in any war at 
any time. Welsh at 340 (emphasis added). 
Applying the above law to the facts in the 
instant case, it is clear that appellant failed to show 
at trial either that he belonged to an organized sect which 
had as a tenet of its beliefs the abhorrence of all 
blood extractions, or that he personally held such a 
"sincere and meaningful belief" which occupied in his life 
a place parallel to the God of an established sect. The 
fact that he merely told Officer Thompson that the blood 
test was against "God's Law", without elaborating as to 
why it was against God's Law, or what basic tenet of his 
religion it violated implies the shallowness of his alleged 
religious belief. Also, the fact of his eventual 
submission to the blood test without resistance (T. 48 Vol.I) 
further shows the lack of sincerity of his purported beliefs. 
'·· 
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Similarly, appellant failed to show his alleged belief, 
that a blood extraction violated "God's Law", was a 
constant ongoing religious tenet. He did not comply witl 
Welsh, supra, by showing that he was opposed to submitting 
to any blood sample at ~ time, and not just a sample 
that would tend to incriminate him. Indeed, the record 
evidences that he served in the Armed Forces, where 
blood tests are a requirement of entry, and was wounded 
in Vietnam, suggesting that he previously had submitted 
to blood tests. (T. 100 Vol.II) 
In summary, the appellant failed in his burden 
to establish the validity and sincerity of his religious 
beliefs. Moreover, because the exception suggested by 
appellant has not been recognized by any court, the general 
rule of Schmerber, ~, should be the controlling law 
governing the blood test in this case. As articulated ~ 
Schmerber, the relevant questions are whether the intrus~ 
is "justified in the circumstances," and "whether the mean: 
and procedures employed in taking his blood respected rele-
vant Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness." 
Schmerber, at 768. 
A review of the facts reveal that Officer ThOrnpso: 
decision to take a blood sample was justified and reasonabli 
-12-
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under the circumstances. A field sobriety test was 
inappropriate, as appellant was visibly injured and 
could have caused additional injury. Moreover, such a 
test might have reflected the injury to the appellant's 
head and the shock of having been involved in a serious 
accident rather than his state of inebriation. Also, as 
recognized by the Supreme Court in Schmerber, "Extraction 
of blood samples for testing is a highly effective means 
of determining the degree to which a person is under the 
influence of alcohol. See Briethaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S., 
at 436 n.3." Schmerber, at 771. In an effort to be 
fair to the appellant, as well as to use a highly reliable 
method, Officer Thompson elected to have a blood sample 
taken. The reasonableness of taking of the sample was 
enhanced further by the fact that the appellant had to 
be taken to the hospital anyway for treatment of injuries 
he sustained in the accident, and Schmerber requires that 
blood samples be drawn in a 'Medical Environment'. Also, 
the appellant's objection that he believed it was 
"against God's Law" to submit to a blood sa'llple was not 
sufficient to put Trooper Thompson on notice of any 
significant religious objection--nor did appellant request 
an alternative form of chemical analysis. 
'·, 
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Additionally, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.lO{a) 
(1953), as amended, states: 
No person, who has been requested 
pursuant to this section to submit to a 
chemical test or tests of his breath, 
blood, or urine, shall have the right 
to select the test or tests to be admin-
istered. The failure or inability of 
a peace officer to arrange for any 
specific test shall not be a defense to 
taking a test requested by a peace 
officer nor be a defense in any criminal, 
civil or administrative proceeding 
resulting from a person's refusal to 
submit to the requested test or tests. 
The Code states unequivocally that the police 
officer, not the arrested driver, is to determine which 
chemical test to use, and the failure of the officer to use 
any particular test is not a defense. In the instant case, 
Trooper Thompson determined that a blood test was most 
appropriate under the circumstances. In light of the 
reasons set forth above, administering a blood test was 
reasonable under the circumstances, and the actions of 
Trooper Thompson conform to both the spirit and letter 
of the rule established in Schmerber. 
Finally, respondent submits that contrary to 
appellant's characterization of the facts, the transcript 
reflects that appellant consented to the blood test. 
,_ 
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In Schneckloth v. Bustamente, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), 
the United States Supreme Court held that where a defend-
ant consents to a search, the search is valid and does . 
not violate the Fourth Amendment, and all evidence seized 
pursuant to the search is admissible. The question of 
whether consent was given is to be determined under the 
totality of the circumstances. Schneckloth v. Bustamente, 
412 U.S. 218 (1973), People v. Renfrow, 172 Colo. 399, 
473 P.2d 957 (1970). The fact that a defendant was 
under arrest, or even in handcuffs, does not per se mean 
that consent to a search was not voluntary and freely 
given. People v. Rodriguez, 168 C.A. 2d 452, 336 P.2d 
266 (1959), People v. James, 19 Cal. 3d 99, 137 Cal. Rptr. 
447, 561 P.2d 1135 (1977). In State v. Yoss, 146 Mont. 
508, 409 P.2d 452 (1965), neither the fact that the 
defendent was under arrest, nor that he was warned that 
a search warrant would be obtained if he refused to consent 
to the search was enough to make the consent per se 
coerced, and the consent was held to be both voluntary and 
competent. No words need to be spoken at all for a person 
to consent to a search, and under appropriate circumstances, 
consent may be manifest by a gesture alone. 
-15-
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People v. James, 19 Cal. 3d. 99, 137 Cal. Rptr. 447, 
561 P.2d 1135 (1977). See also State v. Radford 30 Or. 
App. 807, 568 P. 2d 69 2 ( 1977) . The degree of affirmative 
assistance given to the police by the defendant is 
relevant in determining whether the defendant consents 
to the search. State v. Knaubert, 27 Ariz. App. 53, 550 
P. 2d 1045 (1976). 
In the instant case, Officer Thompson read and 
explained to appellant Utah's Implied Consent Law,§ 41-6·4\ 
which states that a person's driver's license will be 
revoked if he does not consent to a chemical test, and 
Utah's Automobile Homicide Law,§ 76-5-207 which provides 
that in the case of an automobile accident resulting in 
serious injuries to another person, a policeman with 
probable cause may compel the driver to submit to a blood 
test. (T. 47 Vol. 1). 
Since the accident in question involved serious 
injuries to Michael Winn, which later resulted in his 
death, Officer Thompson correctly explained to appellant 
that if he did not consent to the blood test, the test 
would be taken by force if necessary. The appellant refuse 
stating "it is against God's Law," and "I don't want it" 
-16-
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(T. 47,50,53 Vol.I), but when the final preparations 
were made for the test, the appellant freely and of his 
own accord walked into the room where the blood was to 
be drawn, laid down on the gurney and extended his arm 
to Ms. Kay Fowler who was to draw the blood. Ms. Fowler 
proceeded to draw the blood in her normal fashion without 
encountering any difficulty or requiring any assistance. 
Although appellant knew that if he did not 
consent, a blood sample would be drawn anyway, because 
Trooper Thompson merely explained the relevant State law 
and did not threaten any illegal action, no coercion was 
involved. Under the rules explained in People v. James, 
supra, and State v. Knaubert, supra, consent may be 
unmistakenly manifest by action alone without any words 
being spoken. The facts that appellant willingly walked 
into the room, laid down on the gurney and extended his 
arm to facilitate the blood extraction indicate that he 
freely and voluntarily consented to the blood sample. 
Appellant's actions in failing to resist the 
blood extraction also fall within the holding of this court 
in State v. VanDam, 554 P.2d 1324 (Utah 1976). The 
petitioner in that case was charged with rape. The 
-17-
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prosecution took hair samples from him to use as eviden~ 
Petitioner stated he would not resist the taking of the 
hair samples, but made clear that they were taken over 
his objections. On appeal, Petitioner asserted the 
taking of the hair samples over his objections constitute 
an "unreasonable search" and violated the Fourth Arnendrnen 
This court held that the search was not compulsory; that 
even though the appellant objected, his Fourth Amendment 
rights were not violated because he offered no resistance 
Defendant urges that the hair 
taking (after arrest and while in 
custody, when defendant volunteered 
that he wouldn't resist but would 
object) violated his Utah and 
federal constitutional rights under 
the Utah section and Fourth and Fifth 
federal Amendments ... 
As to state and federal consti-
tutional provisions mentioned; de-
fendant was not compelled to give 
a) evidence, b) or be a witness 
against himself. The officers re-
lieved him of the hair (without any 
resistance) . Under such circumstances 
the cases say no constitutional 
rights are violated. {Emphasis added.) 
Applying the reasoning of VanDam to the instant 
case, although appellant objected to the blood test, be-
cause he did not "resist" the extraction of the blood 
sample, he was not "compelled" to give evidence, and 
consequently his Fourth Amendment rights were not violatec 
'·, 
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In Summary, Respondent asserts that appellant 
failed to establish at trial the validity of his "religious 
scruples" objection to the blood test; that Schmerber, 
supra, did not explicitly or implicitly recognize a 
religious exception; that the taking of the blood sample 
was reasonable under the circumstances as required by 
Schmerberi and that appellant, in fact, consented to the 
blood extraction. Consequently appellant's Fourth 
Amendment rights were not violated, and the blood test 
results were properly admitted into evidence. 
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B. 
APPELLANT WAS NOT COM-
PELLED BY THE THREATENED USE 
OF FORCE [TO PERMIT THE BLOOD 
SAMPLE TO BE TAKEN] IN VIOLA-
TION OF HIS FOURTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS UNDER ROCHIN. 
Appellant contends that his Fourth Amendment 
privacy rights were violated when Trooper Thompson told 
him· that if he did not voluntarily submit to a blood 
test, the test would be compulsorily administered. In 
support of this argument appellant cites Rochin v. 
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
Respondent submits this argument is without 
merit for several reasons: 
First, Rochin, supra, is distinguishable from 
the instant case, and appellant's attempt to extend its 
holding to this case stretches it far beyond it's appro-
• 
priate parameters. Rochin, supra, involved an incident 
where the police,after receiving information that appella~ 
was selling narcotics, walked into appellant's apartment 
through his open door. Appellant was sitting half-dress~ 
on his bed. The police saw two suspicious looking 
capsules on the night stand, but as they approached 
appellant grabbed the capsules and placed them in his 
mouth. The officers jumped on appellant and tried to 
-20- '-. 
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extract the capsules from his mouth, but he had already 
swallowed them. The police then handcuffed the appellant 
and took him to the hospital to have his "stomach pumped.." 
In his vomit, the police found two capsules containing 
morphine that were used as evidence in his conviction. 
In response to this form of police misconduct, the court 
stated: 
We are compelled to conclude 
that the proceedings by which this 
conviction was obtained do more than 
offend some fastidious squeamishness 
or private sentimentalism about com-
batting crime too energetically. This 
is conduct that shocks the conscience. 
Illegally breaking into the privacy 
of the petitioner, the struggle to 
open his mouth and remove what was 
there, the forcible extraction of 
his stomach's contents~this course 
of proceeding by agents of government 
to obtain evidence is bound to offend 
even hardened sensibilities. They 
are methods too close to the rack and 
the screw to permit of constitutional 
differentiation. 
342 U.S. at 172 (1952) 
In Rochin, the brutal violation of the integrity 
of the appellants' person offends one's sense of decency, 
and is a shocking denial of due process and the Fourth 
Amendment right of privacy. 
'·, 
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However, the Court nowhere licensed the 
extension of the holding to cases where violation of 
privacy rights were merely threatened. The case purported 
to protect only actual and blatant violations of one's 
privacy rights over his person, and appellant has cited 
no authority substantiating his suggested extension. In 
fact, the court took pains to limit the applicability of 
the decision stating: 
In deciding this case we do not 
needlessly bring into question deci-
sions in many states dealing with 
essentially different, even if related 
problems. 
Rochin, at 174 (1952). 
In the instant case, Officer Thompson did not 
engage in any behavior that even remotely resembles the 
facts of Rochin. Here, there was no phy$ical violence, 
and no forcible intrusion violating the integrity of the 
appellant's person. Consequently, the Fourth Amendment 
privacy violations Rochin was designed to protect are 
conspicuously absent in this case. 
In the alternative, assuming (without admitti~I 
that Rochin does extend to cases involving mere "threats 
of violence," the police actions must still constitute 
-22-
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"conduct which shocks the conscience." Appellant argues 
that Trooper Thompson engaged in "indiscriminate threats 
of violence" and "psychological intimidation," and that 
this "shocks the conscience" and satisfies the test. 
This claim, however, is not supported by the record. 
Trooper Thompson merely advised appellant of the Utah 
statutory· law governing the situation. He told him 
that 1) if he did not consent, his driver's license would 
be revoked pursuant to Section 41-6-44; and 2) because 
the accident victim was seriously injured, if the appellant 
did not submit voluntarily, the blood sample could be 
compulsorily extracted pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-207. 
In advising the appellant of the relevant Utah 
law, he was only fulfilling his duty. The tenor of these 
remarks do not ring of "violence" or "brutality." Rather, 
their tone is one of urging the appellant to submit to 
the blood test so that force would not be necessary. 
Certainly, Trooper Thompson's actions were not conduct 
which "shocks the conscience." Indeed, Trooper Thompson 
should be commended for his patience and restraint, and 
civility in encouraging appellant to submit voluntarily, 
rather than forcibly extracting the blood sample, as 
authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207. 
'·. 
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Finally, since Rochin was decided in 1952, it 
has been limited in scope and application by subsequent 
decisions. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (19661 
a blood sample was compulsorily extracted over the objec-
tions of the appellant. He challenged the 'trial court's 
admission of the blood sample as a violation of his privacy 
and due process rights under Rochin. The United States 
Supreme Court held that compelling a person to give a bloo<l 
sample did not violate his privacy and due process rights 
when the blood sample was drawn in a hospital by qualified 
medical personnel (as was done in the instant case). See 
also Briethaupt v. Abram; Warden, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). 
In the instant case the blood test was administered in 
St. Mark's Hospital (T. 43 Vol. I) by Ms. Kay Fowler, who 
was authorized by the City and County Health Department 
to draw blood samples for the police (T. 4 7, 60 Vol. I). 
Since Schmerber, supra, held that under certain 
circumstances a person's blood could forcibly be withdrawn, 
it follows that merely "threatening" to take blood, under 
the circumstances authorized in Schmerber, supra, does not 
violate one's privacy or due process rights. 
-24-
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c. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
5-207 (1953), AS AMENDED, 
IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
OVERBROAD; FUTHERMORE AP-
PELLANT LACKS STANDING TO 
CHALLENGE THE CONSTITU-
TIONALITY OF THE STATUTE 
ON THE BASIS OF OVERBREADTH. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(2), (1953), as 
amended, states: 
The presumption established by 
section 41-6-44(b) of the Utah Motor 
Vechicle Act, relating to blood 
alcohol percentages, shall be appli-
cable to this section and any chemical 
test administered on a defendant with 
his consent or after his arrest under 
this section, whether with or against 
his consent, shall be admissible in 
accordance with the rules of evidence. 
Appellant argues that the statutory language 
allowing the results of any chemical test administered 
with or without a defendant's consent to be admissible 
subject only to the rules of evidence is unconstitutionally 
overbroad and violative of the principles set forth in 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), Rochin v. California, 
342 U.S. 165 (1952), and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757 (1966). 
At the outset, it should be noted that appellant's 
claim of overbreadth was not raised at trial, and is being 
'·. 
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raised for the first time on appeal. Therefore, the iss~: 
not timely preserved for appeal and should accordingly be d. 
missed. Se~ First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Utah State 
University, 544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975); David v. Mulholla~, 
25 Utah 2d. 56, 475 P.2d 834 (1970); and State v. Tritt, 
23 Utah 2d 365, 463 P.2d 806 (1970). 
Secondly, respondent submits that appellant 
lacks standing to attack the constitutionality of the 
statute on overbreadth grounds. The United States Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that: 
One to whom application 
of a statute is constitutional will 
not be heard to attack the statute 
on the ground that impliedly it 
might also be taken as applying to 
other persons or other situations 
in which its application might be 
unconstitutional. 
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960) . 1 
l Heald v. District of Columbia, 259 U.S. 114, 123; 
Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar 
Co., 226 U.S. 217; Collins v. State of Texas, 223 U.S. 
288, 295-296; People of State of New York ex rel. 
Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 160, 161; Cf. Voeller 
v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 537; 
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 
513; Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 
515,558; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 442; 
Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. Emmerson, 271 U.S. 50, 54-55; 
Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.S. 571, 576; Tyler v. 
Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405; 
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 
347-348. 
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This same rule has also consistently been invoked 
by the Utah Supreme Court. In State v. Tritt, 23 Utah 
2d 365, 463 P.2d 806 (1970), a case involving a con-
viction for contributing to the delinquency of a minor, 
petitioner claimed that the statute describing the 
offense was unconstitutionally vague. The Utah Supreme 
Court held the statute valid and stated: 
It is a generally held rule that 
even if a statute may be unconstitu-
tional as applied to certain indi-
viduals or situations it will not be 
stricken down at the behest of one 
who is not adversely affected by 
the defect. 
Id. at P. 809. 
See also State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936 (Utah 1975), 
Justice Hall's concurring opinion in Salt Lake City vs. 
Piepenburg, 571 P.2d 1299, 1301 (Utah 1977), State v. 
Barlow, 107 Utah 292, 153 P.2d 647 (1944), and State 
ex rel. Johnson v. Alexander, 87 Utah 376, 49 P.2d 408 
(1935). 
Appellant's first contention appears to be that 
Section 76-5-207 is unconstitutionally overbroad be-
cause it does not carefully specify under what conditions 
the chemical tests may be administered. However, re-
gardless of the specificity of the phrase of the statute 
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in question, in the instant case all of the requirement: 
of Schmerber and Rochin, suora, were fully and care-
fully complied with. The record indicates that the 
blood sample was drawn after appellant's arrest based 
on probable cause that he was intoxicated, and was 
administered in St. Mark's Hospital by a registered 
nurse authorized to draw blood samples for the police. 
The principles of Rochin, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), were 
also complied with in the present case (see Point I-B). 
Consequently, because appellant's constitutional rights 
were not 11 adversely affected 11 by the alleged consti-
tutional defect of the statute, he lacks requisite 
standing to attack its validity on the assumption that 
it might violate the constitutional rights of others 
if applied to them under different circumstances. 
The second ground for appellant's claim of 
overbreadth is that the statute allows in evidence of 
a chemical test result "regardless of who the test is 
administered to." Appellant's brief at p. 13. This 
claim assumes that appellant is part of a constitutional: 
protected class of defendants who, because of their 
status in the class, need not allow blood samples to 
be extracted. (e.g. those who object to blood extractio: 
,_ 
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because of certain religious scruples.) Respondent, has 
already shown in Point IA, supra, that appellant does not 
fit in such a class. Thus, he lacks standing to assert 
the argument on behalf of others. Moreover, respondent 
has also shown that the United States Supreme Court has 
not yet ruled that blood samples cannot be taken without 
the consent of such persons with alleged religious scruples, 
nor has it created such a constitutionally protected class. 
The Court expressly reserved the question for a later time 
in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Thus, 
Utah's statute should not be prematurely ruled unconstitu-
tionally overbroad absent resolution of the above issue 
first. Additionally, when a court interprets a statute, 
it should presume that the legislature was aware of the 
relevant case law in effect at the time, and intended the 
statute to be read in light of, and in harmony with the 
existing case law. Moragne v. States Marine Lines Inc., 
398 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970), U.S. 
v. Thomas, 82 U.S. 337 (1872). Moreover, this Court 
stated in Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805 (Utah 1974), that: 
it is the well established 
rule that legislative enactments are 
endowed with a strong presumption of 
validity; and that they sh~uld not ~e 
declared unconstitutional if there is 
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any reasonable basis upon which they 
can be found to come within the con-
stitutional framework; and that a 
statute will not be stricken down as 
being unconstitutional unless it 
appears to be so beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
In determining whether the 
statute carries out that purpose, it 
should not be given any tortured or 
strained application to conjectured 
or hypothetical situations, but should 
be understood and applied in a fair, 
realistic and practical manner to 
the situation confronted, and in the 
awareness that all of the law is not 
stated in one sentence or one paragraph, 
but a statute is to be construed and 
applied in relation to other require-
ments of the law. 
Id. at p. 806-807. 
In the case at bar, appellant objects to the 
language of Section 76-5-207 which allows police to use 
11 any chemical test administered in any manner. 11 Without 
specifying the constitutional standards enunciated in 
Schmerber, and Rochin, supra, which govern such activity. 
In short, appellant contends that the statute is uncon-
stitutionally overbroad because Schmerber and Rochin, supra, 
were not codified in the statute. However, according to 
the above rules of statutory interpretation,this Court 
should presume that in enacting the statute, the legislatun 
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intended that it be read in light of the governing standards 
of Schmerber and Rochin, supra. In other words the statute 
should be interpreted as requiring that when a blood te~t 
is taken without consent and without a warrant, it may be 
taken only upon probable cause after arrest, and by a 
qualified personnel in a medical setting. Consequently, 
the statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad. 
In summary, even if appellant is allowed to raise 
the issue of unconstitutional overbreadth of Section 76-
5-207, supra, for the first time on appeal his argument 
lacks merit because he has no standing to attack the 
statute, and because the statute is not overly broad in 
its application. 
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D. 
THE ADMISSION INTO 
EVIDENCE OF THE CHEMICAL 
TEST RESULTS OF THE BLOOD 
SAMPLE DID NOT VIOLATE 
APPELLANT'S RIGHTS UNDER 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 OF 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Appellant concedes at pages 13-14 of his brief 
that the privilege against self-incrimination of the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution has been held 
to be applicable only to evidence which is of a testimonial 
or communicative nature, and does not extend to physical 
evidence such as blood samples taken involuntarily from 
an arrestee. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
Nevertheless, appellant claims that the wording of Utah's 
Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination con-
tained in Article 1, Section 12 extends a greater privil~ 
to him than that accorded by the Fifth Amendment. He 
argues that Article 1, Section 12 prohibits the admissibili' 
of any evidence taken without his consent, including non-
testimonial physical evidence, which tends to incriminate 
him. 
At the outset, respondent reasserts that the 
record shows appellants blood sample was not involuntari.!1 
extracted (Point I-A, supra), and therefore appellant's 
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privilege against self-incrimination was not violated 
under either the federal of state constitutional provisions. 
Assuming arguendo, however, that the blood sample was 
taken without appellant's consent, respondent submits 
that the extent of the privilege accorded by the Utah 
Constitution is no greater than that of the Federal 
ConstitutiDn. It should be noted that this issue has 
previously been before this court and has been rejected 
in dictum. See State v. VanDam, 554 P.2d 1324 (Utah 1976). 
The language of the two constitutional provisions 
is as follows: Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution - "No person .•. shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself. 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution - "The 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself. 
A review of cases decided by the United States 
Supreme Court, the supreme courts of other jurisdictions 
with identical or similiar language as found in Article 1, 
Section 12, and a review of Utah cases clearly refutes 
the interpretation of Article 1, Section 12, appellant 
would have this Court adopt. 
One of the foremost authorities on evidence, 
'·· 
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Professor Wigmore, discusses in his treatise on Evidence 
the history of the privilege against self-incrimination, 
the forms of disclosure protected, and the ever-present 
problem of interpretation of legislative intent as per-
taining to the drafter of state constitutions. He gives 
a few indicia which can be used to help explain what the 
drafters of various constitutions meant by their words, 
and concludes with the assertion that "the probabiliti~ 
substantially favor the conclusion that the constitutional 
protections were originally intended only to prevent a 
return to the hated practice of compelling a person, in 
a criminal proceeding directed at him, to swear against 
himself." 2 
The learned professor further states in § 2263 
the interpretation of the privilege given by most every 
jurisdiction in the United States, including the United 
States Supreme Court: 
The history of the privilege 
(§ 2250 supra)--especially the spirit 
of the struggle by which its extablish-
ment came about--suggests that the 
privilege is limited to testimonial 
2 Wigmore on Evidence, Section 2252, p.324. 
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disclosures. It was directed at the 
employment of legal process to extract 
from the person's own lips an admission 
of guilt, which would thus take the 
place of other evidence. That is, it 
was intended to prevent the use of 
legal compulsion to extract from the 
person a sworn communication of his 
knowledge of facts which would 
incriminate him. 
* * * 
In other words, it is not merely 
any and every compulsion that is the 
kernel of the privilege, in history 
and in the constitutional d~finitions, 
but testimonial compulsion. 
The majority of courts in jurisdictions where 
this question of self-incrimination has arisen have found 
the state and federal self-incrimination statutes to be 
identical in application, though different in written form. 
In State v. Moore, 79 Wash.2d 51, 483 P.2d 630 
(1971), the Washington Supreme Court ruled that their 
state's constitutional provision in Art. I, § 9, providing 
that no person shall be compelled to give "evidence" 
against himself,provides the same guarantee as that pro-
vided in the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, 
and that protection of both constitutional provisions 
extended only to testimonial or communicative evidence. 
3 Wigmore on Evidence, Section 2263, p.378. 
-35-
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The Arizona Court in State v. Stelzriede, 101 
Ariz. 385, 420 P.2d 170 (1966), held that the privilege 
against self-incrimination protects an accused only from 
being compelled to provide the state with evidence of a 
testimonial or communicative nature, and this privilege 
is not violated by a compulsion which makes a suspect the 
source of real or physical evidence. This ruling was 
in light of an Arizona constitutional provision almost 
identical to Utah's which states in Art. 2, § 10, that 
"no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to 
give evidence against himself •• 
The Oklahoma Constitution which states in part 
"no person shall be compelled to give evidence which 
will tend to incriminate him. , " was held in State 
v. Thompson, 538 P.2d 1080 (Okla. Crim. 1975), to be 
consistent with the common law, and affording no greater 
privilege than the Fifth Amendment. This ruling over-
turned an earlier 1964 decision, and brought the case 
law in line with the United States Supreme Court's decisior. 
in Schmerber, supra, limiting the privilege to testimonial 
evidence. 
While respondent could discover no Utah cases 
where this Court has clearly indicated whether this state 
'-. 
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follows the United States Supreme Court and the majority 
of other state supreme courts in limiting the privilege 
to testimonial evidence, there are three cases which shed 
some light on this issue. 
In State v. Spencer, 28 Utah 2d 12, 497 P.2d 636 
(1972), this court stated that requiring a defendent to 
participate in a line-up did not violate his privilege 
against self-incrimination under Article 1, Section 12 of 
the State Constitution. 
In State v. Sims, 30 Utah 2d 251 516 P.3d 354 
(1973), this Court dismissed a defendent's contention 
that he was compelled to give evidence against himself 
when the police seized and subjected articles of clothing 
belonging to him to scientific tests. 
Thus, in the above cases the compulsory production 
of non-testimonial evidence was not found violative of 
Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
Moreover, in State v. Kelbach, 23 Utah 2d 231, 
461 P.2d 297 (1969), the Court dealt with an appeal from 
a murder conviction based, in part, on a claim that a 
paraffin test, taken to ascertain the presence of gun powder 
on the hands of the petitioner was an unconstitutional 
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search and seizure. In support of its conclusion that 
the appellant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated 
the Court cited with approval to Annotation: Physical 
Examination or Exhibition of, or Tests upon, Suspect or 
Accused, As Violating Rights Guaranteed by Federal Constitu: 
16 L. Ed. 2d 1335-1336. 'i\Then quoted in full, that passage 
also has bearing on the Fifth Amendment concerns involved 
in the instant case: 
In numerous federal cases, the 
principle has been applied or recog-
nized that it is proper, subject to 
qualifications relating to the con-
cept of fundamental fairness, to 
make use of the body of a person 
charged with crime, or detained with 
reasonable cause, as the case may be, 
either as real or physical evidence 
in itself, or as the basis for evi-
dence of that nature developed from 
such use (as distinguished from 
verbal or "testimonial" declarations), 
without violating prohibitions against 
self-incrimination as embodied in the 
Fifth Amendment, or implied by the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Araendment, or without violating 
the Fourth Amendment prohibition 
against unreasonable searches and 
seizures as applicable directly to 
federal prosecutions, and, through 
the agency of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
to state prosecutions. 
Surrunarizing up to this point, the United States 
Supreme Court, and the majority of state courts have held 
'·. 
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that the privilege against self-incrimination is limited 
to testimonial evidence. Historical fact fortifies this 
position, indicating the intent of the drafters of the 
United States Constitutions and the state constitutions 
patterned after it, was to include only testimonial evi-
dence in the privilege. Although this court has not 
specifically resolved this issue, there is caselaw 
indicating that non-testimonial evidence is not protected 
by Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
In support of his argument that it is an estab-
lished doctrine of this court that Article 1, Section 12 
of the Utah Constitution "is broader than the comparable 
federal self-incrimination privilege of the Fifth Amendment," 
Appellant's Brief at page 13, the appellant cites only 
two cases as authority. Appellant cites first to the 
1912 case of State v. Sirmay, 40 Utah 525, 122 p.748 (1912), 
in which petitioner, convicted of first degree murder, 
appealed in part on the ground that matching his shoes 
against footprints at the scene of the murder compelled 
him to give evidence against himself in violation of the 
Utah Constitution. 
-39-
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The passage quoted by appellant states: 
It is generally held, and as 
stated in 12 Cyc. 402, that although 
evidence, incQuding documents,and 
other articles, may have been ob-
tained in a criminal case by unfair 
or illegal methods, it is neverthe-
less, as a general rule, admissible 
if relevant, provided the accused 
is not thereby compelled to do any 
act which incriminates him, and 
the confession or incriminatin'g ad-
mission is not extorted from him; 
and by the weight of authority it 
is held to be error to compel the 
accused to submit to a comparison 
of footprints and to permit a 
witness who was oresent when the 
accused was forcibly compelled to 
place his foot in footprints, or 
to surrender his shoes for the 
purpose of making a comparison, 
to testify as to the result; but 
where the accused voluntarily 
places his foot in the tracks, or 
surrenders his shoes to the sheriff, 
he cannot object to evidence that 
they seemed to fit. (Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 753. 
The appellant relies on a sentence which stated that pol~ 
may not properly admit evidence obtained by compelling a 
defendent to "do any act which incriminates him." How-
ever, on closer scrutiny, the fact that this statement ~~F 
merely dicta, and inapplicable to the instant case is 
apparent. First, the statement was dicta, because the 
'·. 
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court held that the petitioner voluntarily allowed his 
shoes to be compared to the footprints, so he was not 
"compelled to give evidence against himself." Secondly, 
the statement that evidence is admissible only if "the 
accused is not compelled to do anything which incriminates 
him" is relevant only to evidence obtained by "unfair or 
illegal methods." The evidence in the instant case (the 
blood test results) was fairly and legally obtained (see 
Points I A & B, supra). Also, although the Court said 
that an accused may not be compelled to do "any act," 
when read in context with the next phrase, which states: 
"and the confession or incriminating admission is not 
extorted from him," the scope of "any act" is limited to 
confessions or verbal admissions. Thus, although the 
phrase "compelled to do any act" is somewhat vague, the 
court intended it to refer only to testimonial evidence. 
Finally, the Sirmay decision was decided in 1912, long 
before this Court's more recent treatment of the issue 
in Spencer, Sims and Kelbach, supra. 
Appellant also cites to State v. VanDam, 554 
P.2d 1324 (Utah 1976) to illustrate that Art.l Section 12 
of the Utah Constitution extends broader self-incrimination 
protections than the Fifth Amendment. In VanDam, a rape 
'-. 
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case, the court admitted in evidence hair samples taken 
without resistance from the defendant. Although this is 
clearly permissable under the Fifth Amendment, the defens. 
appealed on the grounds that this violated Art. 1 Sectio 
of the Utah Constitution. In its opinion, the court 
acknowledged that the question of the breadth of Art. 1 
Section 12, vis-a-vis the Fifth Amendment, was before the 
Court. However, as noted earlier, this question was not 
resolved because the case was disposed of on other grourn 
(the evidence was held admissable because its production 
was voluntary, not compulsory): 
Defendant urges that the hair 
taking (after arrest and while in 
custody, when defendant volunteered 
that he wouldn't resist but would 
object) violated his Utah and 
federal constitutional rights under 
the Utah section and Fourth and 
Fifth federal Amendments. Defendant 
also urges that the Utah section 
had a broader application than the 
Fifth Amendment. 
As to state and federal con-
stitutional provisions mentioned, 
defendant was not compelled to give 
a) evidence, b) or be a witness 
against himself. The officers 
relieved him of the hair (without 
any resistance). Under such cir-
cumstances the cases say no con-
stitutional rights are violated. 
554 P.2d 1324,1325. 
'-. 
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Since the court disposed of the case without 
ruling on the breadth of Article 1, Section 12, VanDam, 
supra, lends no strength to the claim that this section 
extends the privilege against self-incrimination to 
non-testimonial as well as testimonial evidence. 
In summary, the claim that Article 1, Section 12 
extends to non-testimonial evidence is not an established 
doctrine of this court nor of a majority of those jurisdictions 
which have addressed the issue. Moreover, the authorities 
appellant cites to support this claim are not on point. 
Respondent submits that the extent of the privilege accorded 
by the Utah Constitution is the same as that of the United 
States Constitution, and consequently the lower court's 
decision to admit the results of the blood test should 
stand. 
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POINT II 
THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE 
BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST RESULTS WERE ES-
TABLISHED BY EXPERT TESTIMONY AND 
PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE. 
In the present case a blood test administerE 
to appellant approximately 1.5 hours after the accider 
registere~ a blood alcohol level of .28%. Appellant 
argues that the test results were improperly admitted 
into evidence because the prosecution's expert witnes! 
allegedly did not establish the probative value of the 
test results as required by Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.: 
(J953), as amended, which states: 
In any action or proceeding in 
which it is material to prove that 
a person was driving under the in-
fluence of alcohol, the results of 
a chemical test or tests as author-
ized in § 41-6-44.10 shall be ad-
mitted as evidence if the chemical 
test was taken within one hour of 
the alleged incident. The level 
of the alcohol determined to be in 
the blood by the chemical test 
shall be presumed to be not less 
than the blood alcohol level of 
the person at the time of the 
incident. If the chemical test 
was not taken within one hour after 
the alleged incident, the evidence 
of the amount of alcohol in the 
person's blood as shown by the chemi-
cal test is admissible if expert 
testimony establishes its probative 
value and the results of said test 
may be given prima facie effect if 
established by expert testimony. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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Respondent submits that the probative value of 
the test results was established, and consequently the 
test should have prima facie effect as to the presumption 
of intoxication. 4 
Appellant admits that the leading case in this 
jurisdiction defining "probative value" is State v. Scott, 
111 Utah 9, 175 P.2d 1016, 1021 (1947). This case states 
4 Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(2) states in relevant portion 
that "the presumption established by Section 41-6-44(b) 
of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act, relating to blood alcohol 
percentage shall be applicable to this section ... " 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(b) (3) states: 
(b) In any criminal prosecution 
for a violation of subsection (a) of 
this section relating to driving a 
vechicle while under the influence 
of alcohol or in any civil suit or 
proceeding arising out of acts al-
leged to have been committed by any 
person while driving or in actual 
physical control of a vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol, the 
amount of alcohol in the person's 
blood at the time alleged as shown 
by chemical analysis of the person's 
blood, breath, or other bodily sub-
stance shall give rise to the fol-
lowing presumptions: 
* * * 
3. If there was at the time 
0.08 per cent or more by weight of 
alcohol in the person's blood, it 
shall be presumed that the person 
was under the influence of alcohol; 
'-. 
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"that all evidence having probative value-that is, that 
tends to prove an issue, is admissible." The standard 
is clear and simple. The probative value threshold is 
met as long as evidence tends to prove an issue. The 
facts reflect that this standard was met. 
• 
Trooper Clark Bowles, an authority on the sub-
ject of alcohol absorption and burn-off rates, was called 
by the prosecution as an expert witness to establish the 
blood test's probative value (T.100 Vol. III). In cal-
culating the outside parameters of the appellant's blood 
alcohol level at the time of the accident, Trooper Bowles 
used data on absorbtion and burn-off rates that he acq~r~ 
through over one hundred experiments. (T.102 Vol. III.) 
He stated that on an empty stomach alcohol was absorbed 
into the blood stream within 15-30 minutes, and if there 
was food in the stomach the absorbtion process took from 
1 to 1.5 hours (T.108 Vol. III). He testified that the 
absorbtion rate is relatively constant and does not vary 
much between individuals and the blood alcohol burn-off 
is also relatively constant (T.106 Vol. III). He also 
stated that the average burn-off rate is .015% per hour, 
extending possible up to . 02% in some individuals (T. llO, 
119 Vol. III). Taking all these factors into consideration, 
'·. 
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when presented the facts in evidence in this case (T.139 
Vol. III), Trooper Bowles testified that it was not pos-
sible for appellant's blood alcohol level to have been 
below .08% at the time of the accident (T.141 Vol. III). 
Due to the many variables involved, such as when appellant 
last ate and consumed liquor prior to the accident, Trooper 
Bowles could not state with certainty what the ~ 
blood alcohol level was at the time of the accident. 
However, he did state with certainty that appellant's 
blood alcohol level could not have been below .08% based 
on the facts in evidence. 
This same issue arose in a case recently argued 
before this court. In State v. Chavez, P.2d (No. 
16132, filed December 31, 1979), the petitioner, appealing 
a conviction for automobile homicide, claimed that the 
prosecution had not established the probative value of 
blood test results taken 1.5 hours after an accident. 
As in the instant case, the expert witness in Chavez,supra, 
Dr. Finkle, did not know when the appellant took his last 
drink, and so could not relate back the blood test results 
with absolute certainty. In fact, Dr. Finkle's conclusion 
that petitioner's blood alcohol level was above the 
statutory presumption (.08%) at the time of the accident 
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was stated more equivocally than was the conclusion of 
Trooper Bowles. Dr. Finkle stated it was "extremely 
unlikely" that the peritioner's blood alcohol would be 
below . 10%, where as Trooper Bowles, in the instant case, 
testified that in his opinion "it would not be possible" 
for appellant's blood alcohol level to have been below 
.08% (T.141Vol. III). 
However, despite the uncertainty of the expert 
witness in Chavez, supra, this Court in the conclusion 
of that opinion stated: 
Defendant also asserts that the 
District Court erred in admitting the 
results of the blood analysis, in in-
structing the jury concerning the 
presumptions of intoxication as set 
forth in Section 41-6-44(b) 3, and 
in denying defendant's motion to dis-
miss, contending that there was little 
or no evidence that defendant was 
intoxicated at the time of the col-
lision. These arguments are without 
merit and we do not discuss them. 
Green Sheet Opinion at page 4. 
Because the court in Chavez, ~· found the 
prosecution to have met the probative value standard of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.5 (1953), as amended, a similar 
result should be reached in this case, where an even 
stronger showing of probative value was made. 
'·. 
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Appellant argues that if he consumed some 
alcohol between the accident and the time of his arrest, 
then Trooper Bowles could not state with certainty wheth-
er appellant's blood alcohol level was above .08% at the 
time of the accident. 
Appellant's argument is totally hypothetical 
and without any relation to the facts established in the 
case. Appellant introduced absolutely no evidence indi-
cating that he actually drank between the time of the 
accident and his arrest, and the evidence that was intro-
duced at trial lends no support to this hypothetical. 
When appellant stopped and climbed out of his jeep, there 
were three witnesses at the scene. They observed that 
his face was splattered with blood, that he had blood on 
his teeth, and that he was bleeding from a cut on his 
forehead (T. 103,123,127,128 Vol. 1, T.35 Vol. II). 
After one of the witnesses made a citizen's 
arrest, appellant pushed by him and entered the house, 
saying he was going to wash the blood from his face. The 
witnesses waited with appellant's brother in front of the 
house for him to return. Appellant was in the house and 
out of the sight of the witnesses only momentarily (from 
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30 seconds by one account (T. 126 Vol.l) to "a moment" 
or three to four minutes by another account (T. 10, 13 
Vol. II)). He entered the house on the premise of wash-. 
ing the blood from his face and mouth, and he returned 
outside carrying a wash cloth. The witnesses also obsen~ 
the appellant's slurred speech, poor balance, and difficult 
in walkini prior to his entering the house, and testifi~ 
that he appeared to be drunk (T. 9 8 Vol. 1) . Under these 
circumstances, the suggestion that during the few seconds 
he was alone in the house he drank sufficient alcohol to 
raise his blood alcohol level from below . 08% to . 28% is 
totally implausible and unsupported by the record. 
Combining the facts stated above with the expert 
testimony of Trooper Bowles, the evidence presented in the 
case has "tended to prove the issue of intoxication and 
thus the probative value of the blood test results. State 
v. Scott, 175 P.2d 1016, 1021 (1947). Consequently the 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.5 (1953), as 
amended, were satisfied, and the blood test results sh~N 
be given prima facie effect in establishing that appellant 
was legally drunk at the time of the accident. 
In the alternative, Respondent submits that the 
-so-
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obligation to establish the "probative value" of the 
blood test results under § 41-6-44.5, supra, does not 
apply to automobile homicide proscutions under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (1953), as amended, which expressly 
provides, in relevant part: 
(2) The presumption established 
by section 41-6-44(b) of the Utah 
Motor Vehicle Act, relating to blood 
alcohol percentage shall be applicable 
to this section and any chemical test 
administered on a defendant . . . after 
his arrest .... , shall be admissible 
in accordance with the rules of evidence. 
Respondent merely points out the fact that the legislature 
did specifically mention§ 41-6-44(b) of the Motor Vehicle 
Act, to the exclusion of other statutes. Futhermore, 
§ 76-5-207(2) specifies that" .•. any chemical test 
administered . . . shall be admissible in accordance with 
the rules of evidence." Respondent again points out the 
fact that the legislature specifically stated that the 
chemical tests be admissible according to the rules of 
evidence, not according to § 41-6-44.5. 
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POINT III 
THE PROSECUTION FOR AUTOMOBILE 
HOMICIDE WAS NOT BARRED BY UTAH'S 
SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE RULE AS PRO-
VIDED IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-401 
(1953), AS AMENDED. 
In the instant case, after the appellant was 
arrested for a hit-and-run auto-pedestrian accident, it 
was discovered that he was driving while under the influ-
ence of alcohol, without a driver's license and without 
proper vehicle registration or safety inspection. Appel-
lant was arraigned and pled guilty to these charges in 
Justice's court, August 1, 1977. Two days later his guilty 
pleas on the above charges were vacated, and he was then 
prosecuted in district court for automobile homicide and 
failure to stop at the scene of an injury accident. 
Appellant argues that the subsequent prosecution 
in district court on the automobile homicide charge should 
have been barred by the operation of Utah's Single Criminal 
Episode Rule as Contained in Title 76, Chapter 1, sectioM 
401 through 403 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953), as 
amended. 
Respondent submits that the elements necessary 
to bar a subsequent prosecution have not been established, 
and consequently appellant's claim is without merit. 
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Utah adopted Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403 (Supp. 
1975) which bars a second prosecution for the same or 
different offense arising out of the same criminal episode-
that was the subject matter of the first prosecution. It 
reads: 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecu-
ted for one or mor~ offenses arising 
out of a single criminal episode, a 
subsequent prosecution for the same 
or different offense arising out of 
the same criminal episode is barred 
if: (a) The subsequent prosecution 
is for an offense that was or should 
have been tried under § 76-1-402(2) 
in the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution 
(ii) Resulted in conviction 
Further, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(2) (Supp. 
1975), reads: 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish 
separate offenses under a single 
criminal episode, unless the court 
otherwise orders to promote justice, 
defendant shall not be subject to 
separate trials for multiple offenses 
when: (a) The offenses are within the 
jurisdiciton of a single court, and 
(b) The offenses are known to the 
prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first 
information or indictment. 
Whether or not these provisions apply depends 
on whether the conduct of the accused comes under the 
definition of "single criminal episode." Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 76-1-401 (Supp. 1975), defines "single criminal episode" 
as follows: 
In this part unless the context 
requires different definition, 'single 
criminal episode' means all conduct 
which is closely related in time and 
is incident to an attempt or an 
accomplishment of a single criminal 
objective. 
·As provided in these statutes, the following 
elements must be established to bar a subsequent prosecutio: 
1. The offenses are within the jurisdiction of 
a single court. 
2. The offenses are known to the prosecuting 
attorney when the first information or indictment is brough: 
3. The offenses must be closely related in time. 
4. The offenses must arise from the same crirnina: 
objective. 
If any one of these elements is not established, then a 
subsequent prosecution may not be barred. 
Since the adoption of the Single Criminal Episode 
Rule in 1973, this court has dealt with these elements~ 
the following cases: State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d 1206 (Utah 
1977); State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977); StateJ'.:_ 
Cooley, 575 P.2d 693 (Utah 1978); State v. Schroeder, 598 
P.2d 373 (Utah 1979); State v. Sosa, 598 P.2d 342 (Utah 
1979); Hupp v. Johnson, P.2d No. 16603 (Utah 19801· 
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The first element that must be established is 
that the various offenses were within the jurisdiction of 
the same court (§ 76-1-402(2) (a) ,supra). The intent of 
the single criminal episode rule is to bar multiple prose-
cutions when those actions could have been joined. When 
joinder of separate offenses arising from the same course 
of conduct is not possible because the offenses are not 
within the jurisdiction of the same court, to hold that 
separate prosecutions are barred would frustrate the intent 
of the statute. It would also force the state into the 
undesirable position of prosecuting only some of the offenses 
committed by a defendant. 
The leading case on this issue is State v. Cooley, 
575 P.2d 693 (Utah 1978). Cooley, supra, involved a sit-
uation where a defendant was arrested and given two citations. 
One citation, a class A misdemeanor was for failing to 
stop at the command of a police officer. The other was 
for the class C misdemeanors of driving with an improper 
license and having no tail lig~t on a boat trailer pulled 
by the defendant's motor vehicle. The defendant pled 
guilty to the class c misdemeanors before a justice of 
the peace, and then claimed that he could not subsequently 
be prosecuted in district court on the class A misdemeanor. 
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This Court held that the plea of guilty before the justice 
of the peace did not bar a subsequent prosecution in distri 
court on the class A misdemeanor. The reasoning of the 
court was that although the offenses arose from the same 
criminal episode, the justice court did not have jurisdicti 
to hear the class A misdemeanor, and the district court 
did not have jurisdiction to hear the class B misdemeanor 
prosecutions. Because the offenses were not "within the 
jurisdiction of a single court." The subsequent prosecutio 
was allowed. 
Appellant, in the present case, concedes that 
Cooley, supra, is controlling (appellant's brief at p. 22-1 
However, without offering any new theory for it's reversal 
and relying only on the Cooley, supra, dissent, appellant 
contends that the decision should be overturned. In essenc 
appellant argues that pursuant to Art. VIII, Section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution, district courts have original 
jurisdiciton in all criminal matters. However, as Cool~, 
supra, carefully sets forth, this broad grant of jurisdicti 
is qualified. 
Article VIII, Section 7 of the 
Utah Constitution provides: 
The District Court shall have 
original jurisdiction in all matters 
civil and criminal, not excepted in 
this Constitution, and not prohibited 
by law; [Emphasis added.] 
Cooley, at 694 
'·. 
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The district court's original jurisdiction may 
be limited by statutory prohibitions. One such limitation 
is found in Utah Code Ann. § 76-16-1 (1953), as amended, 
which provides: 
All public offenses triable in 
the district courts, except cases 
appealed from justices' and city 
courts, must be prosecuted by infor-
mation or indictment, . . [Emphasis added] 
Also, pursuant to Art. VIII Section 7 the prosecution of 
non-indictable misdemeanors has been delegated to justice's 
courts by legislative enactment: 
U.C.A., 1953, 77 16 1. All public 
offenses triable in the district 
courts, except cases appealed from 
justices' and city courts, must be 
prosecuted by information or in-
dictment .... 
U.C.A., 1953, 78-5-4(1). Justices' 
courts have jurisdictio~ of the 
following public offenses committed 
within the respective counties in 
which such courts are established: 
(a) All class B and class C 
misdemeanors punishable by a fine less 
than $300 or by imprisonment in the 
county jail or municipal, prison not 
exceeding six months, or by both 
such fine and imprisonment. 
(b) All infractions and the 
punishments prescribed for them. 
The clear implication of these provisions is 
that the original jurisdiction of district courts extends 
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only to cases brought by information and indictment. 
Since class B & C misdemeanor charges cannot be brought 
by information or indictment (see Haikki v. Faux, 16 Ut~h 
2d 132, 396 P.2d 867 (1964)) they do not come under the 
original criminal jurisdiction of the district courts, 
and the single criminal episode rule is inapplicable. 
·Last year this court considered another case 
dealing with this same issue and affirmed the Cooley,supra, 
decision. In State v. Sosa, 598 P.2d 342 (Utah 1979), a 
defendant appealed from a conviction in Ogden City Court 
on the misdemeanor charges of carrying a loaded firearm 
in a vehicle, and possession of marijuana, and a subsequent 
conviction in state district court for the felony of 
possession of a firearm by a convicted person. The appeal 
claimed that the district court prosecution was barred 
by the single criminal episode rule. This court reject~ 
petitioner's claim and stated: 
A felony or indictable misdemeanor 
must therefore be prosecuted by infor-
mation or indictment in the district 
court. On the other hand, a non-
indictable misdemeanor is appropriately 
prosecuted by complaint in Justice's 
or city courts. 
* * * 
This is totally consistent with our 
decision in State v. Cooley. 
Sosa, at 344, 345. 
'·. 
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In this appeal the charges brought in the 
Justice Court were class B misdemeanors, whereas the 
subsequent prosecution for automobile homicide is a 
third degree felony. Applying the rule established in 
Cooley, supra, and reaffirmed in Sosa, supra, the sub-
sequent prosecution may not properly be barred. 
The second element that must be established to 
bar a subsequent prosecution, is that: 
The offenses are known to the pro-
secuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first 
information or indictment. [Emphasis added] 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (2) (b). 
This requirement is satisfied only if the offense that 
is subsequently prosecuted is known when the defendant 
is arraigned on the first information or indictment. In 
this case, the misdemeanor offenses were not brought by 
information or indictment, they were not even brought by 
a complaint (M.7,9) ! Consequently, because appellant was 
not arraigned on an information or indictment this element 
of the single episode rule was not satisfied. 
The third element that must be established is 
that the prior and subsequently prosecuted offenses were 
closely related in time. Respondent submits that the 
'·· 
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automobile homicide offense was not closely related in 
time to the misdemeanor charges appellant pled guilty ~. 
In State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1977). 
this Court dealt with a similar issue. In that case the 
defendant, at gunpoint, threatened a police officer, took 
his gun and locked him in the trunk of his patrol car. 
The defendant then fled in his own vehicle. Sixty-five 
miles later he picked up some hitchhikers. When the 
defendant realized he was being followed by the police, 
and that a roadblock was set up to apprehend him he in-
formed the hitchhikers that they were his hostages. On 
appeal from his convictions for aggravated kidnapping a~ 
subsequently for aggravated robbery (taking the officer's 
gun) petitioner relied on the single criminal episode 
rule to bar the subsequent prosecution. This court af-
firmed the convictions. The Court held that not only was 
the criminal purpose of the robbery unrelated to the 
kidnapping, but also that "there was a distinct differ~~ 
in time, (that necessary to travel some 65 miles) [and] 
location, (two separate counties} 
There was no evidence presented at trial in 
the present case as to how far the appellant had driven 
·-. 
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prior to the accident. However the thrust of Ireland, 
supra, was not that the defendant had driven 65 miles 
between crimes, but the fact that the two offenses were 
separated by time and distance. 
In the instant case there was a "distinct 
difference" in time and location between the misdemeanor 
offenses and the automobile homicide. Although the misde-
meanor offenses were discovered at the time of the accident, 
they occured before the accident. 
The driving under the influence offense occured 
at the instant the appellant entered the car and began 
driving while intoxicated. The offenses of driving with-
out a license, improper registration, and no vehicle safety 
inspection also occured at the instant appellant began 
driving the car, for until a person begins driving it is 
not illegal to be without a drivers license in a car that 
is not properly registered and has not been safety inspected. 
However, the automobile homicide did not occur until some-
time later when the vehicle appellant was driving struck 
and killed Michael Winn. 
Consequently, because the class B misdemeanors 
were merely discovered, but not committed at the time of 
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the accident, they are not closely related in time as 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401, (1953), as amended, has been 
interpreted and applied by this Court in State v. Irela~, 
supra. 
Neither do the facts of the law support the 
existance of the final element, that the subsequent charge 
of automobile homicide stemmed from the same criminal 
purpose as the misdemeanor offenses. In State v. Cerni~, 
571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977) the defendant was charged and 
convicted for failure to stop at the command of a police 
officer and the unlawful taking of a vehicle. The defendar. 
appealed the subsequent prosecution for failure to stop, 
basing the appeal on the single criminal episode rule. 
This Court held that the rule did not apply because the 
offenses did not stern from the same criminal objective. 
The Court reasoned that "the offenses are different and 
the proof requirements are different," Cornish, at 578. 
Similarly, the offenses and the proof requirement 
in the instant case are different. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1953), as amended, 
defines the offense of driving under the influence of 
alcohol. It states, in part: 
It is unlawful . for any 
person who is under the influence of 
alcohol ... to drive or be in actual 
physical control of any vehicle within 
this state. 
'-. 
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However, the offense of automobile homicide, is defined by 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (1953), as amended, in the following 
manner: 
Criminal homicide constitutes 
automobile homicide if the actor, while 
under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor . . . to a degree which ren-
ders the actor incapable of safely 
driving a vehicle, causes the death 
of another by operating a motor vehicle 
in a negligent manner. 
Section 76-1-207 (1), supra. 
From these statutory definitions it is evident that 
the offenses of driving while under the influence, and auto-
mobile homicide are distinct and separate offenses. The 
automobile homicide offense requires proof of several elements 
not included in the driving under the influence offense. 
The only similarity between the two offenses is a 
common element they share; that the driver operate the vehicle 
while legally drunk. Simply because the offenses share a 
common element does not give rise to any presumption that a 
defendant who commits both, albeit at t different time and 
place, acted with the same criminal objective. Such reasoning 
is no more logical than it would be to reason that because 
simple theft and armed robbery have theft as a common element, 
a man acts with the same criminal objective when he steals a 
candy bar at a grocery store as when he commits armed robbery 
at a service station. 
When the appellant committed the offense of driving 
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under the influence of alcohol, the criminal objective 
was simply to drive the vehicle while he was drunk. How-
ever, the criminal objective at the time of the accident 
was much different. There, the criminal purpose was to 
drive while "incapable of safely driving" and to "negligent 
run a red light, resulting in the accident and death of 
the victim. Therefore, in the instant case the driving 
under the "influence and automobile homicide offenses are 
different, the proof requirements are different, and the 
criminal objective was different. 
The remaining misdemeanor offenses, i.e. , drivino 
a car improperly registered, without a safety inspection 
and without a license, are totally unrelated to the accN~ 
and the resulting automobile homicide charge. 
This court dealt with a similar issue in ~ 
Johnson, No. 16602, P.2d (Utah 1980). In Hupp, ~ 
the defendant appealed from the denial of a petition for 
an extraordinary writ to require a circuit court judge to 
dismiss a drunk driving complaint filed after the judge 
accepted pleas for driving without a license, no safety 
inspection sticker, and no registration certificate. 
Court stated: 
We reject the contention that 
§ 76-1-401 is applicable. The cita-
tions charge separate, independant 
'-. 
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offenses which were committed at 
different times and were entirely 
unrelated to each other. The four 
offenses were not committed to 
accomplish a"single criminal objective". 
Id. at p.l of greensheet opinion . 
In the present case, the traffic offenses appellant was 
charged with have as little in common with the automobile 
homicide offense as did the traffic offenses with the 
subsequent prosecution in Hupp, supra. Consequently, 
appellant was not acting with the same "criminal purpose" 
when he drove the car without a license registration and 
safety inspection as when he struck Michael Winn and then 
fled the scene of the accident. 
In summary, to bar a subsequent prosecution, it 
must be established that the offense subsequently prosecuted 
was under the jurisdiction of the same court that handled 
the prior convictions; the prosecutor was aware at the time 
of the first information or indictment that the subsequent 
charge could be brought; the offenses were closely related 
in time; and the offenses arose from the same criminal 
objective. If any one of these elements is missing the 
single criminal episode rule is inapplicable and the subsequent 
prosecution may not be barred. Respondent asserts that all 
of these elements were not established, and consequently the 
prosecution for automobile homicide was proper. 
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Assuming, arguendo, all of the aforementioned 
elements were established, respondent submits the applicat: 
of the single criminal episode rule would still be inap~ro· 
priate under alternate theories. 
First, the justice court lacked jurisdiction to 
arraign the appellant. Consequently its actions were null 
and void, ·so in effect there was no prior prosecution. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-57-2 (1953), as amended, states: 
Other than as provided by section 
77-13-17, proceedings and actions be-
fore a justices' court for a misde-
meanor offense must be commenced by 
complaint under oath, setting forth 
the offense charged, with such par-
ticulars of time, place, person and 
property as to enable the defendant 
to understand distinctly the char-
acter of the offense complained of, 
and to answer the complaint. The 
complaint shall be commenced before 
a magistrate within the precinct of 
the county or city in which the of-
fense is alleged to have been commit-
ted. [Emphasis added]. 
This requirement is supported by the following statutes 
under title 77 chapter II of the Utah Code which deals 
with making complaints before a magistrate: 
~Every person who has reason to 
believe that a crime or public offense 
has been committed must make complaint 
against such person before som magis-
trate having authority to make inquiry 
of the same. [Emphasis added]. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-11-2 (1953), as amended. 
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~when a complaint is made before 
a magistrate charging a person with 
the commission of a crime or public 
offense, such magistrate must examine 
the complainant, under oath, as to his 
knowledge of the commission of the 
offense charged, and he may also ex-
amine any other persons and may take 
their depositions. [Emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-11-3 (1953), as amended. 
--When an officer or other person 
shall bring any person he has arrested 
without a warrant before a magistrate, 
it is the duty of such officer or per-
son to specify the charge upon which 
he has made the arrest. It is then 
the duty of the magistrate or the coun-
ty attorney to prepare a complaint of 
the offense charged, and cause the 
officer or some other person to subscribe 
and make oath to such complaint, and 
file it. [Emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-11-4 (1953), as amended. 
The statutes require that an action in justice court must 
be commenced by a complaint. If an action is not initiated 
by a formal complaint, this court has held that the justice 
court does not obtain jurisdiction. Spangler v. District 
Court of Salt Lake County, 104 Utah 584, 140 P.2d 755 (1943). 
In Spangler, supra, this Court enforced the com-
plaint under oath requirement of § 77-11-3 and § 77-57-2, 
supra, strictly, declaring the entire proceeding void be-
cause the complaining officer had not sworn an oath to the 
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complaint he signed. The Court stated: 
While no set formula is required 
to constitute an oath in verifying a 
complaint, there must be an unequivocal 
act whereby affiant consciously takes 
upon himself the obligation of an 
oath ... Where it is admitted, or es-
tablished by proper proof, that nothing 
was done except to hand a written, typed 
or printed paper to the complaining 
.party, who without more merely subscribed 
his name therto, such does not constitute 
a complaint under oath as required by our 
statute. 
Id. at 756, 758. 
In the instant case the arresting officer did 
not swear an oath to the complaint, (T. 52). He did not 
sign the complaint, (M. 5 2) . He never even brought a corn-
plaint before the justice of the peace. In fact, the 
record plainly indicates that the justice of the peace 
arraigned the appellant without any complaint at all (M. 1, 
9,26,45,49,52). The justice testified that he was assured 
by the county attorney's office that they would "bring·· 
a complaint right up . (M. 29) . However the assuranc 
of a complaint is not adequate. Utah Law clearly requires 
that the proceedings in a justice's court for a misdemeum 
offense "must be commenced by a complaint under oath," 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-57-2 (1953), as amended. In summary, 
the justice's court never received jurisdiction overt~ 
'·. 
-68-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
misdemeanor offenses, and any action taken by that court 
with respect to those offenses is null and void. 
Consequently, because the prior prosecutions 
are vacated, there was not a subsequent prosecution under 
§ 76-1-401 thru 403, supra. 
Finally, before the automobile homicide prose-
cution was begun in district court, the justice court 
vacated its action in arraigning appellant and accepting 
his guilty pleas on the misdemeanor charges. As a result 
of the order to vacate, the appellant suffered no penalties 
from the purported actions of justice of the peace. 
Appellant paid no fines, he did not make any expenditures 
for attorney fees, he spent no more time in jail than he 
would have anyway while awaiting his trial on the felony 
charges, and there will be no residual effect on his driving 
record. In short, he has not been required to stand the 
expense and hardship of trial which was the concern of the 
dissent in State v. Cooley, 575 P.2d 693 (Utah 1978) cited 
at length in appellant's brief a p. 23. 
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POINT IV 
THE NEW INTERPRETATION OF THE 
AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE STATUTE, REQUIR-
ING PROOF OF CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE, AS 
AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE SHOULD BE 
LIMITED TO PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION. 
In State v. Chavez, P.2d No. 16132 (Utah 
1980), this Court ruled that the negligence element of the 
automobile· homicide statute (Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (191: 
as amended) requires a showing of criminal negligence rather 
than ordinary or simple negligence, and that failure to so 
instruct the jury was reversible error. Appellant argues 
that Chavez, supra, is dispositive of the instant case be· 
cause the trial court rejected appellant's criminal negliger. 
instruction and instead instructed the jury that ordinary 
negligence was the standard. It must be stressed that 
appellant's trial occurred years prior to the Chavez decisic" 
Respondent submits that even though Chavez, supra, 
did change the negligence requirement by overturning this 
Court's previous decisions in State v. Durrant, 561 P.2d 
1056 (Utah 1977), State v. Anderson, 561 P.2d 1061 (Utah 
1977), and State v. Wade, 472 P.2d 398 (Utah 1977), the 
Chavez, supra, decision should have prospective application 
only, and therefore is inapplicable to appellant's case. 
The traditional theory with respect to retroactivi·. 
is the Blackstonian view that judges do not make law, theY 
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merely discover it. Accordingly, when a court reverses a 
prior decision, the new rule is retroactive because it 
reveals what the true law has always been. However, modern 
scholars and jurists have taken a more pragmatic approach 
to the laws governing retroactivity. Justice Cardozo in 
Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 
U.S. 358 (1932), recognized that to avoid injustice or 
hardship, some decisions should not be applied retroactively, 
and each state should decide whether new rules of law should 
be given retroactive or prospective application. Id. at 364. 
The United States Supreme Court followed this 
reasoning in Wainright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973), a case 
factually similar to the instant case. In Wainright, supra, 
the petitioner had been convicted of violating Florida's 
"crimes against nature" statute. In a subsequent case in-
volving the same offense the State Supreme Court held the 
same statute void for vagueness. However, because the new 
ruling reversed several previous opinions upholding the 
validity of the statute, the court gave the new ruling 
prospective effect only, stating, "In view of our former 
decisions, this judgement holding the felony statute void 
is not retroactive, but prospective only." 
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Franklin v. State, 257 So.2d 21 (Fla, Sup. Ct. 1971). 
Because the law he was convicted under was held unconsti-
tutional Stone appealed his conviction, to the State Sup.rel 
Court, however, the court rejected the appeal and affirmed 
the prospective effect of the new rule. Stone then 
collaterally attacked his conviction, and the case eventual. 
was heard ·by the United States Supreme Court, which rejecte 
the appeal, stating that the holding in Franklin v. Sta~, 
supra: 
. . did not remove the fact 
that when appellees committed the 
acts with which they were charged, 
they were on c+ear notice that their 
conduct was criminal under the statute 
as then construed. Thus, the Florida 
Supreme Court expressly ruled in 
Franklin that "this judgment holding 
the felony statute void is not retro-
active, but prospective only." and 
subsequently the Florida courts denied 
appellee Stone's request for relief 
based on the Franklin case. The 
State Supreme Court did not ove~rule 
Delancy with respect t~ pre-Fr~~kl~n 
convictions. Nor was it constitutionally 
compelled to do so or to make retro-
active its new construction of the 
Florida statute: "A state in defining 
the limits of adherence to precedent 
may make a choice for itself between 
the principle of forward operation and 
that of relation backward. It may say 
that decisions of its highest court, 
though later overruled, are law none 
the less for intermediate transactions." 
Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 281 
U.S. 358. 364 (1932). 
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It is thus, well settled law that this court 
may, as a matter of constitutional law, give its opinions 
which overrule prior opinions prospective application only.. 
(See also State v. Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1977)). 
Because the overruling opinion (Chavez, supra) 
requiring an instruction on criminal negligence in auto-
mobile homicide cases, goes to a procedural error at trial; 
the standards developed to govern prospective versus 
retrospective application of a new criminal procedural 
ruling must be reviewed. 
The criteria for retroactive application of a new 
court announced rule in criminal cases were announced by 
the United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. New Jersey, 
384 U.S. 719 (1966). In that case the Court refused to 
retroactively apply Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
In determining whether to give retrospective or prospective 
effect to decisions adopting new rules in criminal cases, 
the Court listed three considerations: (1) the purpose of 
the new rule; (2) the reliance placed upon the former rule; 
and (3) the effect which retroactive application of the 
new rule would have on the administration of justice. 
See 384 U.S. at 727. The major thrust of the first factor 
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is whether the new ruling enhances "the reliability of 
the fact-finding process at trial," Johnson, supra, at 72!, 
However, the court in Johnson, supra, noted that the qu~sti 
of whether the fact finding process is enhanced "is neces· 
sarily a matter of degree," Johnson, ~, at 728-729, anc 
is "a question of probabilities." Id. at 729. In subseque 
criminal procedure cases the United States Supreme Court 
has held that these "probabilities must in turn be weighed 
against the prior justified reliance upon the old standard: 
and the impact of the retroacti vi ty upon the administratio:. 
of justice." Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 287 (1972), 
see also Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298 (1970). After 
weighing these factors, if "the unusual force of the counte 
vailing considerations," Id. at 285-286, (i.e. the prior 
reliance and the effect on the administration of justice) 
weighs in favor of prospective application, then the new 
ruling should be applied only to cases tried after the n5 
rule has been announced. Johnson, supra, 384 U.S. at 732. 
Turning now to the instant case, the first facto~ 
to be considered is the purpose of the new ruling. In 
State v. Chavez, P.2d No. 16132 (Utah 1980), t~ 
Court held: 
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We are therefore of the opinion 
that our previous cases holding that 
automobile homicide requires only proof 
of simple negligence under Section 
76-5-207 are in error, and are over-
ruled. And we hold that a conviction 
of automobile homicide requires an 
instruction on criminal negligence as 
that term is defined in Section 76-2-
1-3 (4), and a determination thereof 
by the jury. 
The purpose of the ruling is to ensure that a person is 
not convicted of automobile homicide unless he acted with 
criminal negligence. The issue then is whether a prospective 
application of the Chavez, supra, ruling would frustrate 
this purpose and if so whether the integrity of the fact-
finding process would be impaired. However, it must be 
kept in mind that this determination is "a matter of degree" 
Johnson, supra, at 728-729. On closer scrutiny the tenor 
of instruction #25 in the instant case indicates that the 
absence of a negligent homicide instruction did not impair 
the fact finding process to any significant degree. The 
pertinent part of instruction No. 25 stated: 
2. That the defendant then and there 
drove the motor vehicle while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor 
to a degree which rendered him incapable 
of safely driving a vehicle; and, 
3. That the defendant so operated or 
drove the motor vehicle in a negligent 
manner; and, 
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(R. 72) 
4. That the defendant then and there 
injured Micharl A. Winn, causing his 
death, by operating or driving such 
vehicle while in such intoxicated 
condition and in such manner. 
If you find that the evidence 
proves each of the above elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty. 
From this instruction a reasonable jury could not fail to 
understand that they could not convict the appellant for 
merely being negligent. In addition to negligence, the jur 
was instructed that they must also be convinced "beyond a 
reasonable doubt 11 that appellant drove "while under the 
influence of an intoxicating liquor, 11 and while 11 incapable 
of safely driving a vehicle. 11 After reviewing the fact tti:· 
his blood registered .28% alcohol content (3.5 times the 
level for statutory presumption of intoxication) (T. 90 vo: 
that he ran a red light (T. 34-35, 42, 65 Vol. II); that 
he struck the victim while the victim was crossing in a 
pedestrian crosswalk (T. 65 Vol. II); and that he did not 
even swerve to avoid the accident or stop to render assist' 
(T. 46 Vol. II), the jury determined that the appellant 
drove his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol W 
a degree which rendered him incapable of driving safely. 
Implicit in this conclusion and the facts supporting it is 
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the notion that in such a situation the actor "ought to 
be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that • 
the result would occur," and that such conduct is a "gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exercise ... " See definition of criminal negligence 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4) (1953), as amended. Therefore, 
even though a criminal negligence charge was not given to 
the jury, the facts of the case clearly show that criminal 
negligence was present. Consequentl~ the absence of a 
criminal negligence instruction did not significantly 
impair the fact-finding process in this case. 
Under the Stovall, supra, test, the probability 
of degree to which the fact finding process might be impaired, 
by prospectively applying the new rule, must be weighed 
against the amount of reliance on the prior rule, and the 
burden retroactive application of the old rule would impose 
on the administration of justice. 
The appellant was arrested in July of 1977, and 
convicted in November of that year for the crime of automobile 
homicide. The trial judge relied on the rulings of this 
court in State v. Durrant, 561 P.2d 1056 (1977) and State v. 
Anderson, 561 P.2d 1061 (1977) which held that in automobile 
'-. 
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homicide cases only a simple negligence instruction was 
required. At the time the instant case was tried, the 
reversal this Court would make in State v. Chavez, 
P. 2d No. 16132 (Utah 1980) was totally unforeseeable. 
In fact, 17 days after the appellant was convicted, thls 
court, in State v. Wade, 572 P.2d 398 (Utah 1977) held 
that a criminal negligence instruction was not required 
in an automobile homicide case for a third time in one 
year. 
In Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 778 (1972) the 
United States Supreme Court determined that the right to 
counsel in a preliminary hearing should not be applied 
retroactively. In considering the reliance on the prior 
rule the Court stated: 
We do not think that law enforce-
ment officials are to be faulted for 
not anticipating Coleman. There was 
no clear foreshadowing of that rule. 
A contrary inference was not unreason-
able in light of our decision in 
Hamilton v. Alabama. 
Id. at 284. 
The same reasoning applies to the facts of t~ 
instant case. The trial judge's reliance was made in~~ 
faith, and according to firmly established rulings of this 
court. There is no reasonable expectation that the judge 
should have anticipated the reversal this Court made ~ 
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Chavez, supra, by requiring that a criminal negligence 
instruction be given to the jury. 
Finally, the retroactive application of Chavez, . 
supra, would have a burdensome impact on the administration 
of justice. All of the automobile homicide convictions 
since 1973 would suddenly lose their finality. Determining 
the amount of prejudice resulting in each case would be 
extremely difficult, and many cases might require retrials. 
This burden would be magnified by the fact that in many of 
the cases, important pieces of evidence may have been 
lost, key witnesses may no longer be available, and even 
if they are available, crucial facts will have faded with 
time. 
In view of the above, the retroactive application of Chavez, 
supra, would result not only in an increased burden on 
the administration of justice, but possibly in the release 
of several convicted felons simply because the trial judges 
relied on the court's established and reaffirmed interpre-
tation of the automobile homicide statute. Such a result 
is inequitable and contrary to public policy. 
Respondent submits that when the impact the 
prospective application of Chavez, supra, would have on the 
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administration of justice, the greater equities are 
served by limiting the new rule to prospective application 
Indeed, this is a case where "the unusual force of the 
countervailing considerations strengthens [the] conclusion 
in favor of prospective application." Stovall v. Denno, 
388 U.S. 293, 299 (1971). 
·Assuming arguendo, that the Chavez, supra, holdi:. 
should be retroactively applied the decision of the lower 
court should not be reversed and remanded, because it did 
not involve prejudicial error. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-42-1 (1953), as amended, statl 
Judgment to disregard errors not 
affecting rights of parties. ~After 
hearing an appeal the court must give 
judgment without regard to errors or 
defects which do not affect the sub-
stantial rights of the parties. If 
error has been committed, it shall 
not be presumed to have resulted in 
prejudice. The court must be satis-
fied that it has that effect before 
it is warranted in reversing the 
judgment. 
Accordingly prejudicial error is not presumed. The court 
must be persuaded of the prejudicial effect of an error. 
The standard appropriate in determining preju~~ 
error is "whether the record discloses error of sufficie~ 
gravity to indicate substantial prejudice to the defendant! 
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rights." This test requires that a "reasonable probability 
of a more favorable result, for defendant, in the absence 
of such error, must exist." State v. Gaxiola, 550 P. 2d 1298 
1303 (Utah 1976), see also Willard M. Milne Inv. Co. v. cox, 
580 P.2d 607 (Utah 1978), State v. Scandrett, 24 Utah 2d 
202, 468 P.2d 639 (1970), Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 
250 (1969). 
The record in the instant case does not disclose 
"error of substantial gravity to indicate substantial 
prejudice to the defendant's rights," not does it support 
a reasonable probability that on retrial a different result 
would obtain if a criminal negligence instruction were 
substituted for the simple negligence charge. 
Appellant's proposed instruction No. 7 (R.93) 
defined criminal negligence in the language of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-103 (4) (1953), as amended, which states: 
(4) With criminal negligence or 
is criminally negligent with respect 
to circumstances surrounding his con-
duct or the result of his conduct 
when he ought to be aware of a sub-
stantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the circumstances exist or the result 
will occur. The risk must be of such 
a nature and degree that the failure 
to perceive it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care 
that an ordinary person would excer-
cise in all the circumstances as 
viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
'·. 
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The fact that appellant drove his vehicle 
through a red light; that his blood registered .28% 
alcohol content; that he struck and killed a boy who was. 
walking in a pedestrian crosswalk; and that he did not 
swerve to avoid the accident, or stop to render assistance 
constitutes a "gross deviation" from the standard of care 
expected of a reasonable person. Given the facts of this, 
there is simply not a reasonable probability that a jury 
could find other than that the appellant "ought" to have 
been aware of the substantial and unjustifiable risk of 
his driving while intoxicated and incapable of driving 
safely, and running a red light. 
consequently, the judgment of the trial court 
should not be reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, respondent 
submits that the conviction and sentence should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DO RIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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